Tag Archives: Security

A Brief Respite from CryptoLocker

A couple of days ago (June 2), the UK’s National Crime Agency announced that law enforcement agencies have effectively disabled key nodes of the GOZeuS network, which provided a key delivery mechanism for CryptoLocker’s ransom malware. They’ve also identified a person believed to be the leader of the criminal enterprise behind GOZeuS, and international officials say that other arrests are “in progress.”

While this is good news, it’s unlikely to be a permanent solution to the ransomware problem, given the distributed nature of Internet-based malware. It does, however, give us some breathing room – perhaps as much as a couple of weeks - to think about how to protect against it.

In case you’re not familiar with what CryptoLocker is, it is a particularly nasty form of malware that first appeared in the fall of 2013, and is typically spread by tricking a user into clicking on a disguised executable. Disguised executables are, in part, enabled by the unfortunate design choice Microsoft made in Windows XP that continued through Windows 7, which was to “Hide extensions for known file types” by default. (Personally, this always annoyed me, and one of the first things I always did when setting up a new PC was to deselect that option. It does appear that it is no longer selected by default in Windows 8 and 8.1.)

This meant that, for example, a Word document that was called “My Important Customer Proposal.docx” would display in Windows Explorer (and elsewhere within the OS) as, simply, “My Important Customer Proposal.” That also meant that if someone sent you an email with a file attachment called MalwareDesignedToStealYourMoney.pdf.exe, it would display in Windows as, simply, MalwareDesignedToStealYourMoney.pdf. An unsophisticated or careless user – or someone who perhaps was just exhausted from a long day and not thinking clearly – might look at the file name and think it was an ordinary Adobe PDF file, and double-click on it to open it up…not realizing that the “.exe” that was hidden from them meant that it was really an executable that was designed to install malware on their system.

“But why,” you might ask, “wouldn’t my anti-virus software protect me against this?” The answer is that some anti-virus products might protect you, depending on how the options are set. But many, if not most, users have local administrator rights to their PCs. (Yes, arguably they shouldn’t, but every IT admin that’s ever tried to take those rights away has had to deal with the howls of protest when users – often top executives – suddenly can’t install iTunes or some other equally essential utility on their PCs.) So unless your AV product is set to scan files whenever they are accessed – a setting that often isn’t enabled even on products that are capable of doing it because it can slow your system down – you won’t know that you’re installing something bad until it’s too late. Local administrators, by definition, have the authority to install software. You launched the installation program, you’re a local administrator, so it’s going to get installed.


Once installed, CryptoLocker checks in with a server on the Internet that assigns a public/private key pair to that PC, and CryptoLocker then happily goes to work using the public key to encrypt all the documents, spreadsheets, pictures, etc., on your system. The latest variants will even encrypt files on network drives if they’re mapped using a drive letter. (So far, it doesn’t appear that CryptoLocker knows how to navigate across UNC paths.) There is even some evidence that the latest variants may wait up to two weeks before locking you out of your files, in the hopes that you will move through a full cycle of backups during that time, meaning that all your backups will also be encrypted and therefore useless to you. Once it’s done its dirty work, you will suddenly be unable to access any of your files, and will be presented with a screen that tells you that you have, typically, 72 hours to submit payment – typically via untraceable money cards or bitcoin – in order to obtain the private key that will decrypt your files. Otherwise, the private key will be automatically destroyed, and your files will be forever out of your reach.

If the thought of having to cough up the equivalent of $300 US or lose all your data leaves you with cold chills (as it does me), what can/should you do?

  • First and foremost, educate your users. One of the most basic rules of computer safety is that you simply don’t open email attachments from people you don’t know – and, for that matter, don’t open them from people you do know unless you were expecting them and know what they are. Remember that it’s not that tough to impersonate someone’s email address. At the moment, most CryptoLocker payloads are disguised as invoices from financial institutions, messages from shipping companies, notices from law enforcement agencies, etc., often with scary messages about account closures, final notices, and amounts due. Also beware of zip file attachments. Make sure your users are aware of these common tricks, so they don’t reflexively click to see what a file attachment is.
  • If you’re still running Windows 7 or earlier, deselect the “Hide extensions for known file types” option. This will at least make it slightly more likely that someone will notice that there’s something not quite right about the file they’re about to click on.
  • Keep your anti-virus products up to date.
  • Restrict permissions on shared folders.
  • Consider removing local admin rights from users.
  • Consider using a prevention tool like “CryptoPrevent” from the folks at Foolish IT, LLC. This is a tool that is free for both private and commercial use – although there is a paid version that will automatically update itself and offers additional features like email alerts when applications are blocked. When installed, it will, silently and automatically, lock down a Windows system by, among other things, preventing executables with double extensions (like “something.pdf.exe”) from running, and preventing executables from running if they’re located in folders where you wouldn’t expect legitimate programs to be located. It implements over 200 rules that will help protect you from other forms of malware as well as CryptoLocker.

    It should be noted that, if you’re running a Professional version of Windows that is joined to a Windows domain, all of these rules could be set via group policies, and there are even pre-packaged prevention kits, such as CryptolockerPreventionKit.zip, available at www.thirdtier.net/downloads that will make it easier to set those group policies. But if you’re not comfortable with the whole concept of group policies and/or you’re not in a Windows domain or you’re running a home version of Windows, CryptoPrevent is a fast and easy way to deal with the issue.

Please do not assume that the latest law enforcement announcements mean that we don’t have to worry about CryptoLocker anymore. It’s estimated that CryptoLocker raked in as much as $30 million just in the first 100 days after it appeared in the wild. With that much money in play, it – or something else like it – will inevitably reappear sooner or later.

Windows XP - Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop

As nearly everyone knows, Microsoft ended all support for Windows XP on April 8. To Microsoft’s credit, they chose to include Windows XP in the emergency patch that they pushed out last night for the “zero day” IE/Flash vulnerability, even though they didn’t have to, and had initially indicated that they wouldn’t. (Of course, the bad press that would have ensued had they not done so would have been brutal. Still, kudos to them for doing it. Given that so many of us criticize them when they do something wrong, it’s only fair that we recognize them when they do something right.)

But what about next time?

The fact is that if you are still running Windows XP on any PC that has access to the Internet, your business is at risk – and that risk will increase as time goes on. The IE/Flash issue should be a huge wake-up call to that effect.

Windows XP was a great operating system, and met the needs of most businesses for many, many years. However, Windows 7 and Windows 8 really are inherently more secure than Windows XP. Moreover, the realities of the software business are such that no vendor, including Microsoft, can continue to innovate and create new and better products while simultaneously supporting old products indefinitely. The “End of Life” (EOL) date for WinXP was, in fact, postponed multiple times by Microsoft, but at some point they had to establish a firm date, and April 8 was that date. The patch that was pushed out last night may be the last one we see for WinXP. When the next major vulnerability is discovered – and it’s “when,” not “if” – you may find that you’re on your own.

Moving forward, it’s clear that you need to get Windows XP out of your production environment. The only exception to this would be a system that’s isolated from the Internet and used for a specific purpose such as running a particular manufacturing program or controlling a piece of equipment. Unfortunately, a lot of the Windows XP hardware out there simply will not support Windows 7 or Windows 8 – either because it’s underpowered, or because drivers are not available for some of the hardware components. So some organizations are faced with the prospect of writing a big check that they weren’t prepared to write for new hardware if they want to get off of Windows XP altogether – and telling them that they had plenty of warning and should have seen this coming may be true, but it isn’t very helpful. Gartner estimates that between 20 and 25 percent of enterprise systems are still running XP, so we’re talking about a lot of systems that need to be dealt with.

Toby Wolpe has a pretty good article over on zdnet.com about 10 steps organizations can take to cut security risks while completing the migration to a later operating system. The most sobering one is #9 – “Plan for an XP breach,” because if you keep running XP, you will eventually be compromised…so you may as well plan now for how you’re going to react to contain the damage and bring things back to a known-good state.

One suggestion we would add to Toby’s list of 10 is to consider moving to the cloud. Many of the actions on Toby’s list are intended to lock the system down by restricting apps, removing admin rights, disabling ports and drives, etc., which may make the system safer, but will also impact usability. However, a tightly locked-down XP system might make an acceptable client device for accessing a cloud hosted desktop. Alternately, you could wipe the XP operating system and install specialized software (generally Linux-based) that essentially turns the hardware into a thin client device.

But the one thing you cannot do is nothing. In the words of Gartner fellow Neil MacDonald (quoted in Toby’s article), “we do not believe that most organizations – or their auditors – will find this level of risk acceptable.”

What You Need to Know About the Heartbleed Bug

You may have heard that a new critical vulnerability has been identified that has affected many Internet Web servers – specifically those that use certain versions of “Open SSL” as a means of encrypting user sessions. We have inspected all VirtualQube.com Web sites, and verified that none of our sites have this vulnerability. However, it is possible that other Web sites you use on a regular basis are, or were, vulnerable. You can find a list of the top 1000 Web sites and their status (“vulnerable” / “not vulnerable”) as of roughly 12:00 UTC yesterday at https://github.com/musalbas/heartbleed-masstest/blob/master/top1000.txt. It is possible that many of the sites listed as “vulnerable” at the time have since patched their servers. However, if you have accounts on any of these sites – and the “vulnerable” list includes some high-profile sites such as yahoo.com, flickr.com, okcupid.com, slate.com, and eventbrite.com – you should immediately change your passwords.

There is also a useful tool available at http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/ that will allow you to check out a Web site if you are unsure whether or not it is vulnerable.

For the more technical in the crowd who are wondering how this vulnerability affects Web security, it allows an attacker to extract data from the memory of a Web server in up to 64K chunks. That may not sound like much, but if enough 64K chunks are extracted, useful information can be reconstructed, including username/password combinations, and even the private encryption key of the server itself. http://www.mysqlperformanceblog.com/2014/04/08/openssl-heartbleed-cve-2014-0160/ contains a list of the specific versions of OpenSSL that are vulnerable to this exploit.

Yet Another Phishing Example

Today, we’re going to play “What’s Wrong with This Picture.” First of all, take a look at the following screen capture. (You can view it full-sized by clicking on it.)

Phishing Email from Aug, 2011

Phishing Email from Aug, 2011

Now let’s see if you can list all the things that are wrong with this email. Here’s what I came up with:

  • There is no such thing as “Microsoft ServicePack update v6.7.8.”
  • The Microsoft Windows Update Center will never, ever send you a direct email message like this.
  • Spelling errors in the body of the email: “This update is avelable…” “…new futures were added…” (instead of “features”) and “Microsoft Udates” (OK, that last one is not visible in my screen cap, so it doesn’t count).
  • Problems with the hyperlink. Take a look at the little window that popped up when I hovered my mouse over the link: The actual link is to an IP address (85.214.70.156), not to microsoft.com, as the anchor text would have you believe. Furthermore, the directory path that finally takes you to the executable (“bilder/detail/windowsupdate…”) is not what I would expect to see in the structure of a Microsoft Web site.”

If you want to know what sp-update.v678.exe would do if you downloaded and executed it, take a look at the description on the McAfee Web site (click on the “Virus Characteristics” tab). Suffice it to say that this is not something you want on your PC.

Sad to say, I suspect that thousands of people have clicked through on it because it has the Windows logo at the top with a cute little “Windows Update Center” graphic.

Would you have spotted it as a phishing attempt? Did you spot other giveaways in addition to the ones I listed above? Let us know in the comments.

Windows 7 and Security

Volume 9 of the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report is out, and it makes for some pretty interesting reading. Among other things, it talks extensively about botnets - the various “families” of botnets, how they are used, how they work, and how access to them is sold and traded on the black market. Why? Because (quoting from the report), “When we look at that intelligence as a whole, it’s clear that botnets pose one of the most significant threats to system, organizational, and personal security.”

One of the things you’ll find in the report is a discussion of the infection rates of different versions of the Windows Operating System. You may have noticed that every now and then, as part of the critical patches and updates that Microsoft pushes to your PC, there’s something included called the “Malicious Software Removal Tool,” or “MSRT.” Microsoft keeps track of how often the MSRT actually finds malicious software when it runs, and that information is presented here as the number of computers cleaned of bot-related malware per 1,000 executions of the MSRT. Take a look at the following graph, which covers just Q2 of 2010 (click to view larger image):

Infection rate found per 1,000 executions of MSRT

I would like to particularly direct your attention to the fact that the infection rate for Windows XP SP3 is four times the infection rate for Windows 7, and the rate for Windows XP SP2 is five times the Win7 rate.

I understand that, for some people, the issue of upgrading from Windows XP to something else borders on being a religious discussion. But, honestly, if Windows 7 is that much more secure - which it clearly is - isn’t it getting a bit difficult to justify the “you can have my Windows XP when you pry it from my cold, dead fingers” position?

Of course, larger enterprises have some challenges to overcome. As we discussed in our September post about the cost of a Windows 7 migration, Gartner recently reported that, since most organizations weren’t planning to begin their Win7 migrations until 4Q2010, and with PC hardware replacement cycles typically running at four to five years at present, most organizations simply will not be able to complete a Windows 7 migration through the normal PC replacement cycle before Microsoft ends support for XP SP3. There just isn’t enough time left.

But even if there was enough time - why would you not want to move to an Operating System that’s four times more secure as quickly as you possibly can?

As Gartner pointed out, one alternative is to move some users to a “hosted virtual desktop” instead of a new PC. Translation: Making VDI part of your migration strategy can help get you out from behind the eight ball. It can also boost the overall security of your organization. Doesn’t that make it a conversation worth having?